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Abstract 
Decades of research in Social Psychology have demonstrated that political 
intolerance is not displayed equally with respect to ideology. In particular, conservatives 
and those with right-wing beliefs are much more likely to display intolerant judgments 
than those with liberal or left-wing beliefs. This "prejudice gap" has been found to be so 
ubiquitous that it is now the conventional wisdom regarding the relationship between 
ideology and intolerance. However, a small, but growing literature challenges this 
presumed ideological asymmetry and has instead found that liberals and conservatives 
display intolerance under certain circumstances. Synthesizing the recent research 
showing ideological symmetry in intolerance judgments, the Ideological-Conflict 
Hypothesis (!CH) was developed. This thesis attempts to expand the literature on the ICH 
by integrating it with multidimensional models of ideology and the growing literature on 
negative emotions. The findings of this analysis support the general assertion made by the 
ICH, but also challenges its utility when predicted by multidimensional models of 
ideology. Additionally, the analysis shows the crucial role of an understudied emotion in 
determining political intolerance: hatred. The analysis thus challenges scholars to better 
integrate the findings of the ICH with more complete models of ideology, while 
expanding the research of emotional effects on intolerance to include hatred. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
In 2007, Fred Ed words, director of communications for the American Humanist 
Association, stated that in America today, "Americans still feel it's acceptable to 
discriminate against atheists in ways considered beyond the pale for other groups" 
(americanhumanist.org, 2015). To back up his statement, Edwards points to 
constitutional provisions across several states of America's "Bible Belt" where atheists 
are barred from running for public office (Bulger, 2015). This example of political 
intolerance is often described as out-of-touch with American values as the U.S. is 
regarded by conventional wisdom as the epitome of a liberal democratic culture 
supporting one of the world's most effective and responsive democracies (Stouffer, 
1955). 
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Democratic societies are built on the concept of political tolerance. Members of 
democratic societies are not expected to agree with individuals who do not share their 
political beliefs, endorse their political objectives, or even like them. However, it is 
expected that they put up with them - meaning that individuals tolerate their rights to free 
speech, to assembly, and to advocate for their political objectives. Such political 
tolerance has been described as the extent to which we extend these and other civil 
liberties and rights to groups or individuals with whom we disagree (Marcus, Sullivan, 
Theiss-Morse, & Wood, 1995; Sullivan, Marcus, Feldman, & Piereson, 1981). 
No matter how much the concept of political tolerance may be a foundation of 
democratic societies, it presents a particular conundrum for any democracy. As 
individuals mature into adults, they naturally identify with certain groups and cast others 
as outgroups. This leaves many open to intolerance. In fact some scholars (e.g. McClosky 
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& Brill, 1983; Aboud, 1988; Devine, 1989) have argued that intolerance may be more 
"natural" than tolerance, given the ubiquity of slavery and oppression throughout human 
history. However, evidence also shows that individuals can be taught tolerance and 
convinced it is an important principle (Avery, Bird, Johnstone, Sullivan, & Thalhammer, 
1992; Brody, 1994 ). In addition, several cultural factors moderate political intolerance. 
The characteristic of individualism central to American culture encourages separation 
from group identity, and American diversity requires interaction with those that are 
different from us. Scholars (e.g. Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Wood, 1995) have 
thus described these characteristics as important cultural precursors necessary for the 
moderation of political intolerance. However, what about those who identify with a 
particular political party or political ideology? Does such moderation exist for individuals 
who identify as conservative or liberal? 
Throughout the Social Psychology literature, research has supported the argument 
that conservatives and individuals with relatively right-wing political beliefs are more 
prejudiced toward and politically intolerant of a variety of groups than are liberals and 
individuals holding relatively left-wing political beliefs (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). The 
research has concluded that conservatives are much more predisposed than liberals to be 
intolerant of groups that go against their worldview, violate their morality, or do not 
conform to their values (Farwell & Weiner, 2000). Together, these results have been 
referred to as the prejudice gap between liberals and conservatives (Chambers, 
Schlenker, & Collisson, 2013). Despite the substantial support for the prejudice gap 
(Sibley and Duckitt 2008), a small, but growing body of evidence suggests that the 
prejudice gap may be overstated. These scholars (e.g. Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, 
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Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014) have challenged the presumed asymmetrical relationship 
that conservatism significantly predicts political intolerance whereas liberalism does not, 
and have suggested that intolerance may exist across the ideological spectrum under 
certain circumstances. To expand and integrate the previous findings on and to present a 
more complete picture of ideological intolerance, the Ideological-Conflict Hypothesis 
was developed. This hypothesis predicts that conservatives and liberals will be similarly 
intolerant against social and political groups whose values and beliefs are inconsistent 
with their own (e.g., supporters of abortion rights for conservatives; opponents of 
abortion rights for liberals). 
In this thesis, the ideological-conflict hypothesis will be tested using a survey 
measuring political intolerance. Additionally, this thesis seeks to illuminate the presence 
of political intolerance beyond the standard left-right political spectrum. Using several 
novel and innovative measures of ideology, the ideological-conflict hypothesis will be 
put to the test in order to answer several questions. First among them is whether or not 
the predicted findings of the ideological-conflict hypothesis can be replicated. Second is 
how the predictions made by the ideological-conflict hypothesis fair against newer, multi-
dimensional models of political ideology. While the hypothesis predicts that liberal and 
conservatives will exhibit similar levels of political intolerance in response to questions 
with social and political groups that they disagree with, little has been said for individuals 
who identify as moderates. In addition, research has suggested that the traditional left-
right spectrum may not pick up ideologies characterized by asymmetric beliefs (e.g. 
individuals who identify as economically conservative, but socially liberal and vice-
versa). Thus, it is possible that by studying other orientations such as Libertarianism or 
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Communitarianism scholars may learn new insights in how political intolerance relates to 
ideologies beyond the traditional spectrum. Finally, this thesis seeks to provide a new 
analysis on how intolerance relates to emotion. New studies (e.g. Halperin, Canetti-
Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009) have shown the relevance of negative emotions in 
influencing political intolerance, and this study seeks to integrate the research on emotion 
with how intolerance exists in contemporary America. 
The second chapter of this thesis examines the extant research on political 
tolerance, focusing on the predispositions and precursors to intolerance. Additionally, the 
chapter seeks to show how this project relates to and fits in with the current scholarly 
literature on ideology and emotion. In chapter three, I discuss the methodology, the data 
collected, and how it was utilized in this project. In the next chapter, several hypotheses 
are proposed relating to the central questions on the ideological-conflict hypothesis and 
its relation to political ideology and emotions. The fifth chapter discusses and presents 
the results of the quantitative analysis. The chapter will be divided into several sections, 
each discussing and testing a set of hypotheses. Lastly, the final chapter will compare and 
contrast these results with the extant literature and discuss conclusions that can be drawn 
from the findings. The chapter will close with a discussion on what possible future 
research is necessary and the theoretical and practical implications of the findings. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Review 
Political Intolerance: Psychological and Social Context 
Political tolerance has been a subject of scholarly inquiry for some time. It is 
typically defined as the extent to which political rights and civil liberties are extended to 
groups or individuals with whom we disagree (Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Wood, 
1995; Sullivan, Marcus, Feldman, & Piereson, 1981). Given this standard definition, 
scholars have examined political intolerance relative to groups that are perceived to have 
inconsistent values with a particular society (e.g. atheists in America) or be a threat to 
society as a whole (e.g. Communists). Following World War II and McCarthyism in the 
1950s, scholars began to ask what psychological and social factors lead to intolerant 
beliefs, particularly in the Western World. Over many decades, political scientists and 
social psychologists had amassed data on the predispositions, cognitions, habits, and 
values of those who display intolerant beliefs and behaviors. 
One of the first studies conducted on political intolerance in America was by 
Stouffer (1955). Researching political tolerance during the Second Red Scare and with 
McCarthyism in full swing, Stouffer analyzed two national samples of the masses and 
one sample of community elites to determine the level of tolerance toward communists 
and related groups. Stouffer found that the tolerant had several psychological and 
demographic factors in common. Particularly, more tolerant individuals had less rigid 
personalities, were less authoritarian in nature, and more optimistic. They were also 
younger, more educated, more urban and non-churchgoers. Stouffer's seminal work was 
the first to show the importance of psychological predispositions and societal factors to 
levels of political intolerance. Continuing Stouffer's legacy, other scholars have found 
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that predispositions, such as personality, play a vital role in determining levels of 
tolerance. Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1982) found that dogmatism, a lack of trust in 
people, and a focus on lower-order psychological needs like safety - collectively known 
as psychological security - were strongly associated with political intolerance. Although 
the construct can be measured differently, other scholars have found similar results: 
authoritarian, close-minded individuals generally adopt intolerant judgments and beliefs 
toward racial, ethnic, or political groups that differ or disagree significantly with them 
(Altemeyer, 1988; Gibson, 1987, 1992; McClosky & Brill, 1983; Nunn et al., 1978; 
Sullivan et al., 1982). 
The idea that personality influences levels of intolerance is widely held and 
studied in the social science literature. Since Stouffer (1955) and others studied 
personality's effect on intolerance indirectly -that is, they were more concerned with 
levels of intolerance in the general public and the possible causes of such intolerance -
other scholars during and after Stouffer's research researched personality and prejudice 
in a more direct manner. Within the literature, there are several divergent theories and 
measures that seek to illuminate how personality influences intolerance and prejudice -
the Authoritarian Personality Theory, Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance 
Orientation, and the Dual-Process Motivational (DPM) approach. Each theory and 
measure has had a lasting impact on the study of intolerance and each presents 
psychological reasons as to why individuals adopt intolerant attitudes. Conceptualized by 
Adorno et al. (1950), the theory of the authoritarian personality was developed from the 
conclusion that generalized prejudice formed part of an even broader dimension of social 
attitudes involving prejudice against out-groups and minorities, glorification of in-group 
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behavior, political and economic conservatism, and antidemocratic attitudes. Adorno et 
al. argued that this attitudinal dimension was the direct expression of an authoritarian 
personality consisting of nine traits as measured by the F Scale. However, research on the 
authoritarian personality soon showed that the theory and F Scale were seriously flawed. 
Specifically, the F Scale lacked reliability and unidimensionality when controlling for 
acquiescent bias, or the tendency for survey respondents to agree with statements 
regardless of their content. This was due to the all-positive formulation of the F Scale's 
items. 
Although the authoritarian personality was shown to be flawed, several reliable 
predictors of intolerance were directly derived from the F scale. Altemeyer (1981) found 
that three of the original nine surface traits of authoritarianism described by Adorno et al. 
( 1950) - conventionalism, authoritarian aggression, and authoritarian submission - did 
co-vary strongly enough to form a unidimension of prejudice. Altemeyer therefore 
developed the Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale to measure this dimension. Subsequent 
research (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996, 1998) showed that the RWA scale was a 
unidimensional and reliable psychometric measure. Later, Sidanius and Pratto (1999; 
Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) proposed another individual-difference 
dimension, the Social Dominance Orientation, as a direct trait on prejudice. Both of these 
two dimensions have been shown to be reliable and powerful metrics for measuring 
general prejudice (Altemeyer, 1998). 
Another model of prejudice - the Dual-Process Motivation approach - suggests 
that SDO and R WA are not personality traits, but rather two basic dimensions of social or 
ideological attitudes that express independent motivational goals for or values of group-
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based dominance and superiority (in the case of SDO) and social cohesion and collective 
security (in the case of R WA) (Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 
2002). According to the DPM approach, the motivational goal or value of social cohesion 
and collective security (expressed in RW A) is made noticeable by the belief that the 
social world is an inherently dangerous and threatening place (as opposed to being a safe 
and secure place), and the predisposing personality dimension is that of social 
conformity. This personality dimension causes individuals to identify with the existing 
social order and be more sensitive to threats to it. They value order and stability, which in 
tum heightens the motivational goal or values of collective cohesion and security 
expressed in high RWA. The motivational goal or value of group-based dominance and 
superiority (expressed in SDO), in contrast, arises from the underlying personality 
dimensions of tough-mindedness and tender-mindedness. People high in tough-
mindedness are more likely to view the world as ruthlessly competitive in which the 
strong win and the weak lose. This makes noticeable the motivational goals or values of 
power, dominance, and intergroup superiority expressed in high SDO. This model 
therefore sees SDO and RWA as social or ideological attitudes that mediate the effects of 
the two personality dimension of social conformity versus tough-mindedness on 
prejudice. In contrast to the more traditional approach, which saw personality as having 
direct effects on prejudice, this approach sees the effects of personality on prejudice as 
being primarily indirect. Whether there is an authoritarian personality that has a direct 
effect on prejudice or a more indirect dual-process motivational approach, the literature 
has consistently held that personality is the predominate psychological trait that outlines 
intolerance and prejudice. 
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Education is strongly associated with levels of political tolerance. Second only to 
personality, education and to a lesser extent, political expertise, gives individuals greater 
acquaintance to broad democratic principles in society (Prothro and Grigg, 1960). For 
Prothro and Grigg (1960), education about democratic principles, or the lack thereof, 
helped to logically connect abstract democratic principles to real life situations. Once a 
formal education ceased the decision to be intolerant or not functions as a standing 
decision. McClosky (1964) agreed with Prothro and Grigg's assumption that a formal 
education is required for political tolerance to occur. McClosky felt that democratic 
beliefs and values, including political tolerance, were unlikely to exist in nature. It is a 
heavy burden for individuals to comply with democratic principles. McClosky saw that 
individuals needed to acquire extraordinary forbearance, self-discipline, and willingness 
to suffer opinions and groups regarded as offensive in order for political tolerance to 
occur. Only "articulates" with formal educations like political elites, who have the 
required experience, knowledge and temperament to tolerate groups or individuals unlike 
themselves, would exhibit strong support for democratic principles and their application 
to tolerance (McClosky, 1964 ). 
Education was also found to be the primary reason behind the increase in political 
tolerance in the replication of Stouffer's (1955) study by Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 
(1978). In Stouffer's (1955) study, individuals were more likely to answer that 
Communists needed be found even if that meant hurting or violating the rights of 
innocent people. 20 years later, Nunn, Crockett, and Williams found that those who 
would rather protect the rights of innocent people (34% in Stouffer's study in 1955) 
increased by nearly 40% in 1973 to 70% of the public opting to protect the rights of 
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innocent people. Nunn, Crockett, and Williams explained this increase by suggesting that 
increases in the number of individuals with higher educations created more tolerant 
standing decisions. However, others (e.g. Marcus, Sullivan, Theiss-Morse, & Wood, 
1995) suggest that it is possible that in combination with higher education levels, the 
information that would later discredit much of the Communist hunts in the 1950s could 
have played a valuable role in the increase in tolerant beliefs toward Communists. 
Although much evidence points to the role education plays in determining levels of 
political tolerance, the role of education has not been without its critics. 
Despite the evidence showing that education is a good predictor of political 
tolerance, some scholars have questioned its direct effects. Beginning in 1979, a group of 
scholars - headed by Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus - challenged the concept that the 
American public had become more politically tolerant. Using the least-liked group 
measure, a then-novel conceptualization of political tolerance as "putting up with" the 
expression of a group (the act) rather than the group itself (the actor), Sullivan, Piereson, 
and Marcus (1979, 1982) showed that the American people did not become more tolerant 
during the 1970s than during the 1950s as Nunn et al. (1978) suggested, but rather 
Americans became less hostile toward the actor/group (e.g. Communists) and just as 
intolerant toward the act (e.g. speech, assembly, etc.). Although, this research challenged 
the primary cause and effect (education and more tolerance, respectively) found by Nunn 
et al. (1978), Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus (1979, 1982) did not reject the notion that 
education as a predisposition has an effect on levels of tolerance. Rather, they suggested 
that education interacted with other variables - such as support for democratic principles 
- to influence tolerance levels. 
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Just as personality and education have been found to be two of the primary 
predispositions influencing tolerance levels, so too are standing decisions. Research has 
shown that the support for the general principles of democracy is widespread among 
Americans and important to tolerance judgments (McClosky & Brill, 1983; Prothro & 
Grigg, 1960; Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1982; Sullivan, Shamir, Walsh, & Roberts, 
1985). However, when such general support is applied to specific situations or groups, 
that consensus breaks down. For example, Prothro and Grigg (1960) found that 90% of 
Americans supported the concept of minority rights, but when that principle is applied to 
Communists, the support breaks down. One way to explain this apparent paradox is that 
individuals rely on standing decision rather than making continuous reassessments. 
McClosky and Brill (1983) discuss the idea that for psychological and sociological 
reasons individuals settle ,upon social norms. By settling on social norms, individuals can 
avoid the psychological pain of continuous conflict and disagreement, and thus have 
stability and predictability in social and political life. This argument also explains why so 
many opt for intolerance in concrete situations. It is because individuals "distrust what 
they do not understand or cannot control" (McClosky & Brill, 1983: 13-14). Thus the 
standing decision for many citizens is one of general support for democratic norms 
coupled with a more specific intolerance. 
From the discussion here of the psychological and social underpinnings of 
political intolerance and prejudice, several conclusions can be drawn. First and foremost, 
the primary psychological element that determines levels of intolerance is personality. 
Whether it be authoritarian, close-minded individuals that demonstrate right-wing 
authoritarianism or a social dominance orientation or a highly educated articulate, 
12 
personality factors as a formidable source of tolerance. Second to personality, education 
acts on levels of intolerance by providing individuals with theoretical knowledge on 
democratic principles that can be applied in real life situations such as when to be tolerant 
toward an out-group. Just as education educates individuals on democratic norms, 
standing decisions provide the backdrop in which individuals can rely instead of making 
continuing assessments. For articulates and non-articulates alike, the common standing 
decision for many is one of general support for democratic norms coupled with a more 
specific intolerance. Each of these psychological and social factors contribute to an 
individual's level of tolerance and provides a basis for which political ideology and 
beliefs can either foster or restrict political intolerance. 
Political Ideology 
The concept of political ideology, the idea that political opinions and attitudes are 
linked together in a coherent system, has been theorized in many different ways and 
forms. As laid out by the authors of The American Voter, political ideology consists of a 
set of interconnected and stable beliefs that describe an individual's general political 
worldview (Campbell et al., 1960). Building on the findings of The American Voter, 
Converse (1964) considered ideology as a type of belief system, which is any 
configuration of ideas or attitudes that are bound together in a form of interdependence. 
Converse argued that in political belief systems some attitudes are held more strongly and 
the number of political attitudes held varies. Converse used the concept of constraint to 
tie these characteristics together and identify ideological thinking. Constraint is 
conceptualized as how attitudes are linked and interdependent, such that holding one 
belief should be accompanied by holding another belief. For example, an individual who 
supports increased spending for education should also favor more spending for health 
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care because both attitudes indicate a liberal belief in an enhanced role for government. 
Thus, ideological individuals hold some centrally important beliefs that are connected to 
other attitudes in a wide-ranging system. 
The primary finding from Converse's work is that the American public is largely 
nonideological. Converse found that the American public does not conceptualize politics 
in ideological terms as people do not mention ideology in their evaluations and opinions 
on politics, but are more apt to use social groups or candidates as their reference. Second, 
Converse found that the public was generally unable to recognize the ideological 
orientations of political candidates and parties. Finally, Converse found that the public's 
opinions were not correlated in a way as to indicate ideological constraint. Thus, for 
Converse, no matter how the question was framed, the consistent and constant answer 
'l• 
was that the vast majority of the public lacked any form of ideological belief system or 
thinking. 
Following Converse's (1964) findings as reported in "The Nature of Belief 
Systems in Mass Publics," many took it to be the conventional way to think about 
ideology. However, other scholars began to introduce other theories in a way to challenge 
the concept of a nonideological and unsophisticated public. According to Nie et al. 
(1976), the political context in the United States must be considered. Converse performed 
his study during the 1950s, when ideological thinking was at an all-time low. But as the 
political context changed - primarily from a large degree of policy agreement among 
parties in the 1950s to more significant divisions in the 1960s and 70s - levels of 
ideological constraint increased. Additionally, Abramowitz (2010) expands on this theory 
by suggesting that recent years have produced a rapid increase in ideological thinking 
among the public. Using the 2008 American National Election Survey, Abramowitz 
found a majority of voters were located at opposite sides on issues, rather than in the 
center. Additionally, opinions on these issues tended to be closely connected. Using 
climate change as an example, Abramowitz found evidence for the type of ideological 
constraint Converse sought, but did not find in his original study. 
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Further opposing Converse's findings, Lane (1962) used interviews with a small 
number of working-class men in one neighborhood to challenge Converse's view of 
ideology. Lane criticized Converse for leaving out personality and social structure. Lane 
found that his sample did have a form of ideological thinking, but their ideology is not 
constrained by the standard liberal-conservative ideological framework that characterizes 
elites. Rather, ideology in the public is constrained by how people think of themselves 
and society. This ideology includes ideas about who should rule, moral codes, and 
fundamental personal values, as well as attitudes toward equality, freedom, and 
democracy. Although Lane (1962) introduced a new concept on the structure of ideology, 
Lane's findings were criticized as not generalizable to the wider population due to his 
small, nomandom, specialized sample. 
A third alternative to Converse's approach to ideology was presented by Achen 
(1975). Approaching Converse's findings from a statistical point of view, Achen argued 
that individuals hold unstable political opinions and attitudes that seem to fluctuate not 
because they have no political opinions or because their opinions are only weakly 
connected to one another, but because of the nature of survey questions. Achen 
developed a model designed to divide ideological constraint into two different sources: 
the instability of voter's attitudes and the low reliability of survey questions. Achen 
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wanted to show that vague and changing survey questions were mainly to blame for the 
instability of public attitudes. When the error was corrected in the analysis, Achen found 
stronger levels of stability between individual attitudes and attitude constraint increased. 
Ansolabehere et al. (2008) extended Achen's work by applying well-known reliability 
estimation procedures to the observed correlations ofrespondents' issue preferences, 
demonstrating that once the observed measures are corrected for unreliability, 
preferences are not only highly stable and tightly constrained, but affect voting choices to 
the same degree as party identification. 
Nearly 50 years after Converse's (1964) work, the debate over ideological 
thinking is not settled. Some research suggests that average Americans are in fact 
ideological in their politics (Layman & Carsey, 2002; Jost, 2006; & Abramowitz & 
Saunders, 2008). Others continue to present evidence that the public is nonideological 
(Feldman, 2003; Bishop, 2005; Kinder, 2006). Some have attributed the recent 
polarization in the public to increasingly polarized elites (Fiorina et al., 2010). Converse 
himself acknowledged that changes in American politics and the public may have 
ushered in a more substantial role for ideology in the American electorate, but he argues 
that the larger picture remains unchanged (Converse, 2006). Many of the critiques and 
alternative theories did not directly refute Converse's findings, but simply tried to 
reinterpret them. 
Political ideology has often been conceived in terms of a single left-right 
dimension. Since 1972, the American National Elections Study has explicitly asked 
respondents to place themselves on a seven-point ideological scale ranging from very 
liberal to very conservative. Like Converse (1964), who tested whether individuals 
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understood and used these ideological labels, the ANES intends this question to measure 
the ideological orientation and strength of individuals. Scholars have argued, though, that 
the traditional left-right spectrum carries implicit problems. Ellis and Stimson (2009, 
2012) argued that ideology has two components: operational and symbolic aspects. 
Symbolic ideology captures the ideological label individuals prefer to use in describing 
themselves. Operational ideology, by contrast, is the actual range of political attitudes 
and issue positions that individuals hold. Ellis and Stimson present evidence that 
although the public tends to be symbolically conservative, it is simultaneously 
operationally liberal. If individuals can hold conservative and liberal positions 
simultaneously, then this presents a problem with the traditional way ideology is 
measured. Traditionally, the left-right, or liberal-conservative, dimension provides a 
measure of an individual's preferences concerning social change versus economic 
intervention. Some scholars (e.g. Saucier, 2000; Layman & Carsey, 2002) have 
conceptualized ideology of consisting of two separate dimensions. One is an economic 
dimension that relates to governmental intervention in the economy and includes issues 
such as progressive taxation, government spending, and redistribution policies. The other 
is a social dimension that relates to attitudes toward traditional moral and cultural values 
and focuses on issues like abortion, same-sex marriage, and the role of religion in public 
affairs. Others have gone further and argued that these dimensions are theoretically 
distinct and empirically only weakly related to one another, making it possible to be 
socially conservative, but economically liberal, or vice versa (Jost et al., 2009). 
Additionally, work by Carmines et al. (2012a, b) presents a typology that shows 
five different ideological groups: liberals, conservatives, moderates, libertarians, and 
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populists. Liberals are those individuals who support redistribution and governmental 
spending on social services while opposing traditionally moralist positions on social and 
cultural issues. Conservatives are the mirror image of liberals. They oppose redistribution 
policies and want to limit governmental size and spending. They tend to be more 
religious and supportive of policies that maintain traditional social mores. Adding to the 
tradition liberal-conservative divide, Libertarians are individuals who hold conservative 
views on the economic dimension but liberal views on the social dimension. They favor 
limited governmental interference in the lives of individuals across all domains of policy. 
Libertarians oppose an expansion of governmental spending and interference in the 
economy. They also oppose limitations on same-sex marriage and access to abortion. 
Populists have conservative social views but liberal economic views. Although they are 
proponents of traditionally moralist policy positions, they also value the increased 
services that result from a large, activist government. They support limitations on 
abortions and same-sex marriage while also approving of redistribution policies and 
governmental spending on social services like Social Security and Medicare. What can be 
concluded from the extant work on ideological dimensionality is that political ideology is 
not as clear cut as it may seem. 
Political Affect and Political Intolerance 
The role of affect or emotion in politics and political behavior has garnered a 
surge of attention in political psychology. Psychology has produced a number of affective 
theories (e.g. Lazarus, 1991; Russell, 1980; Watson & Tellegen, 1985), but few of these 
theoretical perspectives have helped to explain political attitudes and behavior (Marcus, 
2003). Most affective theories sufficiently explain attitudes and behavior in general, but 
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fail to adequately explain political attitudes and behavior in particular (Abelson et al., 
1982; Marcus, 1988; Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Marcus et al., 1995, 2000). Thus, 
political psychologists have come to the conclusion that emotions function differently in 
politics. Political Psychologists argue that theories of affect developed in the fields of 
clinical and social psychology do not adequately explain political attitudes (Marcus et al., 
2000). 
Affective Intelligence Theory 
One of the most influential theories on the role of emotions in politics is Affective 
Intelligence Theory. Developed by political scientists George Marcus, W. Russell 
Neuman, and Michael MacKuen, the Affective Intelligence Model posits a dual systems 
approach to explain political attitudes and behavior. This approach takes a unique 
perspective in that it emphasizes affect - not cognition - as the underlying determinant of 
political attitudes and behavior. According to the Affective Intelligence Model, two 
subsystems of the brain - the behavioral approach system and the behavioral inhibition 
system- govern attitudes and behavior either through (1) the enactment of behaviors 
based on procedural norms, or (2) by altering routine behaviors to account for an anxiety-
inducing threat. The chief hypothesis of the Affective Intelligence model is that when a 
threat is introduced, it raises anxiety levels which then causes individuals to seek out 
information about the source of the threat (be it a political issue, political candidate, etc.). 
As a result, Marcus et al. argue that when anxiety levels are raised, adherence to 
previously held political attitudes diminishes, leaving individuals vulnerable to 
persuasive messages that they would otherwise not consider (Marcus et al., 2000). 
Consequently, a linear relationship between induced anxiety and both attitudinal and 
behavioral outcomes is hypothesized. Thus, the Affective Intelligence model does not 
differentiate between individuals of varying cognitive abilities or psychological traits. 
Rather, it identifies anxiety as a causal force leading individuals to seek out new 
information and figuratively scratch their anxiety-induced itch. 
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While anxiety is the predominate emotion for Affective Intelligence Theory, 
Marcus et al. updated their work to reflect the new knowledge on the biological and 
psychological foundations of emotions. Specifically, the initial focus for the model was 
primarily on two dimensions, an anxiety dimension and an enthusiasm dimension 
(Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Marcus, 1988). Following work done in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, researchers took note of a third dimension, anger (Huddy et al., 2007; Lerner 
& Keltner, 2001; Marcus et al., 2000; Panksepp, 1998). Subsequently, the affective 
intelligence model evolved to include this third dimension (MacKuen, Wolak, Keele, & 
Marcus, 2010; Marcus et al., 2000; Marcus, 2002). Based on these three dimensions, the 
affective intelligence model generates hypotheses specific to each emotion. Hypotheses 
on enthusiasm are about when people become engaged in politics in various ways and 
their extant identifications and convictions (Brader, 2006; Marcus et al., 2000). Anxiety 
is about attention, learning, and reliance on current considerations (Brader, 2006; 
MacKuen, Marcus, Neuman, & Keele, 2007; Marcus & MacKuen, 1993). Hypotheses on 
anger are about the role of normative violations, and defensive or aggressive actions to 
protect their identifications and convictions (Huddy et al., 2007; MacKuen et al., 2010). 
Role of Negative Emotions on Political Intolerance 
Negative emotions are central to the human experience. We all experience anger, 
fear, and hatred. Yet, the examination of negative emotions as antecedents of political 
tolerance has largely gone ignored. To date, most studies on antecedents of political 
tolerance have examined the levels of perceived threat (Stephan & Stephan, 2001 ), 
ideologies, values, and democratic principles (Sullivan, Piereson, & Marcus, 1982), 
personal characteristics like authoritarianism (Duckitt, 1993) or locus of control 
(Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Pedahzur, 2007), socioeconomic status (Quillian, 1995) or 
religious beliefs (Eisenstein, 2006) as the main antecedents of political intolerance. 
However, in recent years researchers (e.g. Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 
2009) have begun to examine the role of negative emotions on political tolerance. 
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In the literature, several negative emotions have been extensively examined for 
their role in political phenomena, albeit not political intolerance. Fear is the most studied 
negative emotion. Along with its close cousin anxiety - which is often used 
interchangeably with fear - the scholarly attention to the emotion is due to its central role 
in human nature. Fear is an aversive emotion which arises in situations of perceived 
threat or danger and (Gray, 1987). The feeling of fear calls attention to the threat, 
prompts an individual to seek out information on the threat, and if doable remove the 
threat - or at least remove themselves from the danger. The role of fear in politics has 
been shown to have spillover effects into the voting booth and political information 
processing. For example, negative campaign advertising with ominous music or violent 
images generate anxiety and fear which in tum affects voting decisions (Brader, 2006). 
The role of fear on intolerance is more nuanced. Research as shown that fear typically 
does not have a direct relationship to intolerance (Capelos & Van Troost, 2007), but does 
have an effect on intolerance through the mediation of variables such as perceived threat 
outgroup derogation or democratic principles (Gibson & Bingham, 1982; Marcus et al., 
1995; Skitka et al., 2004). 
21 
Similar to the feeling of fear is that of anger. While people clearly experience 
anger as a distinct emotion from fear, dimensional models of emotion tend to have 
difficulties separating anger from fear. Because self-reported feelings of anger tend to 
accompany fear, researchers tend to place them in close proximity (Tellegen et al., 1999a, 
1999b ). Nevertheless, four antecedents have been found to distinctly invoke feelings of 
anger, beyond the presence of threats and obstacles: (1) an external cause such as 
someone who can be blamed (Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985); (2) coping 
potential, or the perception that one can control a situation (Carver, 2004; Frijda, 1986; 
Lazarus, 1991); (3) the perception that the situation is unfair or undeserved (Averill, 
1983; Roseman, 1991); and (4) the familiarity of a threat (Marcus, 2002). Each can cause 
anger in isolation or in combination. As in the case of fear, empirical studies do not point 
to a direct relationship between anger and intolerance (Skitka et al., 2004). 
Hatred is a relatively new studied emotion. Hatred can be defined as the most 
destructive affective phenomenon in the history of human nature (Royzman, McCauley & 
Rozin, 2005). This is particularly true when examining its effects on intergroup relations. 
Hatred can reduce support for efforts to compromise on long-term conflicts (e.g. the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict), induces support for aggressive actions toward outgroups, and 
impel people to engage in massacres and wars (Halperin, 2011; Halperin et al., 2011; 
Maoz & McCauley, 2005; Maoz & McCauley, 2008; Staub, 2005). Hatred tends to come 
in two related, but distinct forms: chronic and immediate (Bartlett, 2005; Halperin, 
Canetti, & Kimhi, 2012; Sternberg, 2003). Chronic hatred is a sentimental, stable, and 
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familiar "hating" emotional sentiment. Immediate hatred is an emotional, powerful, and 
"burning" hate, which often occurs in response to significant events. Chronic hatred tends 
to be the more cognitive of the two. It is a deep hatred and involves a rejection of all 
members of an out-group. Immediate hatred is more severe and extreme. It is typically 
developed in response to a severe and significant offense toward the in-group, which in 
turn leads to a total rejection of the out-group. It provokes a strong desire for revenge, a 
wish to inflict suffering, and, at times, desired annihilation of the out-group. (Halperin, 
Canetti, & Kimhi, 2012). Unlike fear or anger, which targets specific actions, hatred 
targets at the fundamental characteristics of the individual or the group (Ben-Zeev, 1992; 
Ortony et al., 1988). However, research has shown that because anger is evoked in 
response to events that individuals perceive as unjust or unfair, it can become hatred 
(Averill, 1982; Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009). Hatred is often 
provoked as a result of recurrent offenses perceived as intentional. Thus, studies on links 
between emotions have often assumed that anger can and will become hatred. 
Due to the limited number of studies on hatred and political intolerance, no 
conclusion can be reached on its political effects. However, preliminary results from one 
study directly measuring the role of hatred on intolerance in Israel found that hatred was 
a powerful antecedent on intolerance, even when fear, anger, and threat perception are 
controlled for (Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009). Therefore, it is likely 
that hatred will need to play a central role in future research on the emotional antecedents 
of political intolerance, not just in countries with prolonged conflicts (e.g. Israel), but also 
western countries where conflict is less common. 
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The Ideological-Conflict Hypothesis 
Since Stouffer's (1955) study on intolerance, researchers have come to find that a 
number of psychological and sociological predispositions influence whether or not an 
individual will resort to intolerant judgements. Throughout the literature, there is 
substantial support for a prejudice gap between liberals and conservatives (Chambers, 
Schlenker, & Collisson, 2013). Specifically, the findings on the prejudice gap have 
concluded that conservatives and individuals with right-wing orientations are more likely 
to be prejudiced toward and intolerant of a variety of social groups in contrast to liberals 
and individuals with left-wing orientations (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). The increased 
prejudice and intolerance displayed by conservatives has been attributed to a variety of 
psychological factors, including being less intellectually sophisticated and more close-
minded (Hodson & Busseri, 2012; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Sibley & 
Duckitt, 2008). Despite the substantial support for the prejudice gap, researchers (e.g. 
Brandt et al., 2014) have begun to challenge the presumed relationship between ideology 
and intolerance. This challenge suggests that the prejudice gap may be overstated. For 
example, recent research has found that liberals and conservatives make negative 
attributions toward groups whose values are inconsistent with their own (Morgan, 
Mullen, & Skitka, 201 O; Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 2002) and 
distance themselves from people who do not share their moral convictions (Skitka, 
Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Furthermore, new research using a variety of samples and 
methods has revealed that both liberals and conservatives express intolerance toward 
groups with whom they disagree (Chambers, Schlenker, & Collisson, 2013; Crawford, 
2014; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014a, b; Lambert & Chasteen, 1997; McClosky & Chong, 
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1985; Wetherell, Brandt, & Reyna, 2013; Yancey 2010). It is research like these that have 
challenged the relationship between ideology and intolerance and have suggested that 
intolerance can exist across the ideological spectrum given the right circumstances. To 
organize and integrate these findings into a coherent picture, Brandt et al. (2014) 
developed the ideological-conflict hypothesis. This hypothesis predicts that conservatives 
and liberals will be similarly intolerant against social groups whose values and beliefs are 
inconsistent with their own. In addition, the ideological-conflict hypothesis posits that 
both liberals and conservatives dislike ideas that conflict with their own and, thus, engage 
in a variety of strategies to maintain their worldview. In this thesis, the hypothesis will be 
tested and expanded using multidimensional models of ideology and integrated with 
theories of affect to better illustrate the psychological and political dimensions of 
intolerance in contemporary America. 
Ideology and Intolerance: The Disagreement 
In recent years, some political scientists and social psychologists have challenged 
the findings of the political intolerance and ideology literature. One perspective maintains 
that political conservativism significantly predicts intolerance and liberalism does not 
(ideological asymmetry). For example, Lindner and Nosek (2009) found evidence of 
ideological asymmetry: specifically, conservatism predicted political intolerance of anti-
American speech, but liberalism did not predict political intolerance of anti-Arab speech. 
Others maintain that conservativism and liberalism significantly predict political 
intolerance given the right circumstances (ideological symmetry). For example, Crawford 
and Pilanski (2014b) found evidence of ideological symmetry: conservatism predicted 
intolerance ofleft-wing targets, whereas liberalism predicted intolerance ofright-wing 
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targets. This disagreement stems from several areas of contention, most notably the way 
to adequately measure political intolerance and ideology. 
This disagreement can be clearly seen in the recent back-and-forth between 
scholars studying political intolerance. One group of scholars (e.g. Linder and Nosek, 
2009) claim that the conservatism still predicts intolerance more than liberalism does. 
They back up this claim with a recent analysis showing just that. However, other scholars 
(e.g. Crawford and Pilanski, 2014b) have shown that previous works are 
methodologically flawed and provided evidence that liberalism and conservatism predict 
intolerance equally. Each group maintains that evidence backs their specific claims on 
ideology and intolerance, but it is clear that further work is still needed. 
Other research has found inconsistent findings related to the interaction between 
political ideology and intolerance. Even though the results found by Crawford and 
Pilanski (2014b) are inconsistent with Lindner and Nosek's (2009), as well as other 
evidence of ideological asymmetry in the literature (Davis & Silver, 2004; Sniderman, 
Tetlock, Glaser, Green, & Hout, 1989), they are consistent with evidence of ideological 
symmetry in political intolerance judgments (Chambers, Schlenker, & Collisson, 2013; 
Suedfeld, Steel, & Schmidt, 1994; Wetherell, Brandt, & Reyna, 2013). Further research is 
thus necessary to illuminate better methods of measuring political intolerance and settle 
the disagreement about political ideology and intolerance. 
Bias in Social Psychological Research 
The central postulate of the ideological-conflict hypothesis is that the extant 
research on the relationship between political ideology and political intolerance is flawed. 
Specifically, the methodological, survey, and experimental approaches used in the past 
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research has been biased in favor of liberals and biased against conservatives. In other 
words, social psychologists and political scientists have, either wittingly or unwittingly, 
framed survey questions or used methods that showed liberals are less likely to be 
intolerant than their conservative counterparts. Such alleged bias is not new, as science 
has been shown to not always be self-correcting (Ioannidis, 2012; MacCoun, 1998; 
Nickerson, 1998). Indeed, the allegations that political and social psychology are biased 
in favor of liberals has been recognized for some time, but have gone largely ignored 
(MacCoun, 1998; Redding, 2001; Tetlock, 1994). 
Research on bias in social and political psychology has been pursued on several 
fronts. Among the first questions needed to be answered was are the ideological leanings 
of social psychologists biased in favor of liberals. This line of questioning has gone 
largely unexamined with only one study attempting to quantify the ideological leanings 
of social psychologists. With a sample size of 193 9 from the Society of Personality and 
Social Psychology, Inbar and Lammers (2012) found that 85.2% of the participants 
identified their overall ideology as liberal and 6.2% as conservative. Breaking down the 
numbers by issues, 90.6% identified as liberal on social issues compared to 3.9% as 
conservatives; 63 .2% as liberal on economic issues compared to 17 .9% as conservative; 
and 68.6% as liberal on foreign policy issues compared to 10.3% as conservative. 
Furthermore, evidence suggested that the ideological disproportion is increasing: whereas 
10% of faculty identified as conservative, only 2% of graduate and postdoc fellows did 
so. Although the limitations (e.g. combining "soinewhat liberal" with "liberal") to this 
study do limit its generalizability, the results do point to a field of research dominated by 
liberals. 
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The causes of such disproportion in social psychology has been theorized. Some 
researchers have found that people on the left may be more attracted to careers in social 
psychology than those on the right (Duarte, Crawford, Stem, Haidt, Jussim, & Tetlock, 
2014). Others have attributed the disproportion to more nefarious biases. Multiple studies 
have found that humans privilege information that comports well with their pre-existing 
beliefs, preferences, attitudes, and morals (Kunda, 1990; Nickerson, 1998; Stanovich, 
West, & Toplak, 2013). These biases/processes include confirmation bias, myside bias, 
and motivated reasoning. Thus, scientists are not immune to the various forms of 
confirmation bias, including political ones (Eagly, 1995; Lilienfield, 2010). Another more 
malicious process found to be at least partially responsible for the disproportion is the 
creation of majoritarian political and theoretical norms. Specifically, ideological 
homogeneity, like that seen in social psychology, can alone produce strong liberal norms 
which give rise to felt pressures to conform to liberal views, a reluctance to express non-
liberal views, and even the inclination to derogate and punish psychologists who express 
conservative views (Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950; Miller & Morrison, 2009; 
Prentice, 2012; Schachter, 1951). Empirically, the Inbar and Lammers (2012) study 
provides evidence of this potential hostile climate. When asked to state their willingness 
to discriminate against conservative colleagues in symposia invitations, grant funding, 
publication acceptance, and hiring, the authors found that those declaring some 
willingness was at 56%, 78%, 75%, and 78% respectively. This relatively high 
endorsement of discrimination against conservative colleagues shows support for the idea 
that liberals do engage in discriminatory behavior, as predicted by the ideological-conflict 
hypothesis. 
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Chapter 3. Methodology 
In order to ascertain the relationship between political intolerance, ideology, and 
emotion, a survey was designed, implemented, and analyzed. Following IRB approval, a 
random sample of undergraduate and graduate students were sent emails asking for their 
participation in a study on political ideologyi. In order to reduce response bias, the 
participants were not told that the primary goal of the survey was to measure levels of 
political intolerance. This deception was necessary as to prevent the aforementioned 
response bias as well as the social desirability of people wanting to appear tolerant. Given 
that the survey's respondents were college students (Mage= 25.90, SD= 8.7l)i\ the 
sample likely has homogeneity in age and political ideology (i.e. respondents are more 
likely to be young and politically liberal), as college students are more likely to have 
these features. Therefore a defense of using college students as an experimental sample is 
justified. 
David Sears (1986) once described the use of college students in social 
psychology research as a "narrow database," i.e. there are problems with internal and 
external validity when using college students as a sample. Indeed Political Science as a 
discipline has become skeptical of the validity of lab studies using college students 
(Bartels, 1993; Benz & Meier, 2006; Gerber & Green, 2008; Jacoby, 2000; Kam et al., 
2007; Lijphart, 1971; McGraw & Hoekstra, 1994; Sears, 1986). Additionally, researchers 
(Druckman & Kam, 2011) have found that external validity with regard to student 
samples depends on three considerations: (1) the research agenda on which the study 
builds (e.g. has prior work already established relationship with student subjects, meaning 
incorporating other populations may be more pressing?), (2) the relative generalizability 
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of the subjects, compared to the setting, timing, and operationalizations (e.g. a study 
using students may have more leeway to control these other dimensions), and (3) the goal 
of the study (e.g. to build a theory or to generalize one). 
Given these three considerations, the current work seeks to: (1) build on prior 
work that utilized multiple samples (e.g. student, non-student, American and non-
American) and (2) generalize and build on a theory (i.e. the ideological-conflict 
hypothesis). Additionally the current work was able to control the setting of the survey 
( online) and the operationalization of variables. Also of importance here is what the study 
intends to do. The ideological-conflict hypothesis postulates intolerance on both the left 
and right. Thus, to fully ascertain the characteristics ofliberal-based intolerance, a sample 
where the respondents are more likely to identify as liberal would be necessary at a basic 
level. What is clear though is that political scientists need not be guilty of a "near 
obsession" with external validity (McDermott, 2002: 334). Rather when understood fully, 
student samples can be a valuable sample body to test theories and hypotheses. Thus, 
when used in combination with other sampling bodies, can produce a full picture of the 
distinctions being examined. 
Once students clicked the link sending them to the survey page, they were 
directed that their responses and identities would be confidential, safely secured, and they 
could exit the study at any time without penalty. Participants were asked to provide 
political intolerance judgments of six random political and social activist groups. These 
groups included Focus on the Family, the NRA, American Atheists, Emily's List, the 
Socialist Party of America, and the Sierra Club. Unlike previous research, the groups 
were not selected with prior knowledge from a predetermined list, but were randomly 
selected from a list containing both liberal and conservative social and political groups. 
Research has suggested that individuals who are not open to new experiences express 
intolerance against groups who represent new, potentially threatening views (Jost et al., 
2003; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008), as well as those individuals who violate their moral 
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values (Graham et al., 2009; Wetherell et al., 2013). It can be assumed too that the 
absolute number of social groups that conservatives see as potential outgroups would be 
higher than it is for liberals. Conversely, given that many groups with conservative values 
tend to be larger in terms of population than are social groups with liberal values (e.g., 
Evangelical Christians outnumber atheists/agnostics), liberals may be intolerant toward a 
larger absolute number of individuals. In order to validate this "absolute-value" 
hypothesis, the political and social groups in this study were chosen at random from a 
population of social and political groups without the a priori consideration of their 
consistency with liberal or conservative values that was made in prior work. By randomly 
choosing the target groups, firmer conclusions can be drawn about the true size and 
variability of the ideological-conflict effects in the real world (Fiedler, 2011). 
The groups selected for the population sample were similar to those used in 
previous research (i.e. Crawford, 2014; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014b), meaning that the 
groups chosen for the list corresponded to specific policy areas. Once a list of political 
and social groups was composed, six were chosen at random for the intolerance 
measures. Political intolerance for each group was assessed with 6-point item scales (1 = 
Strongly Disagree; 6= Strongly Agree) for each target. These items were similar to those 
used by other researchers (Crawford, 2014; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014b ), and derived 
from Marcus et al.' s (199 5) political intolerance measure. Items were averaged based on 
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the ideology of each group to form the political intolerance measures (a= .89 for liberal 
group measure, a= .85 for conservative group measure), which included both positively 
and negatively worded items based on extant worded items (see Appendix). 
Next, participants provided feeling thermometer ratings for each target (0 =very 
cold, 100 = very warm; reverse-scored so that higher scores indicated more prejudice), 
which were averaged to form the prejudice measure (a= .83). This measure of prejudice 
uses single-item feeling thermometer ratings that capture global affective target 
evaluations (Abelson, Kinder, Peters, & Fiske, 1982), but do not necessarily capture the 
physical or psychological distancing that often characterizes prejudice (Dovidio, Esses, 
Beach, & Gaertner, 2002; Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005). Therefore, the current study 
also utilizes a multi-item measure of social distance (Skitka et al., 2013) as an additional 
measure of prejudice. Social distance was measured with three items drawn from Skitka 
et al. (2013), each following the stem, "How willing or unwilling would you be to have 
someone from each of the following groups ... ?": "come work in the same place as you 
do," "marry into your family," and "as a close personal friend." Items were completed on 
a 6-point scale (1 =Very unwilling; 6 = Very willing), and were reverse-scored to 
indicate greater social distance (a= .91). 
Participants then indicated the extent to which they think each group: "violates 
your core values and beliefs" (symbolic threat); "takes away societal resources from 
people like you" (realistic threat); "makes our society more dangerous and less safe" 
(safety threat); and "restrict the personal rights of people like you" (rights threat). These 
items were derived from extant measures of these different types of intergroup threats 
(Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Duckitt, 2006; Gibson & Gouws, 2003; Stephan & Stephan, 
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2000), and were measured on 7-point scales (1 =to no extent at all; 7 =to a great extent). 
Scores were averaged across the six groups to form four separate threat measures (as = 
.82, .79, .83 and .87 for symbolic, realistic, safety, and rights threats respectively). 
To set up the political ideology variables, several measures were composed from 
extant models of unidimensional and multidimensional ideology. To begin, participants 
reported their political ideology on the standard unidimensional model (1 = Extremely 
Liberal; ?=Extremely Conservative) and reported party affiliation (1 =Strong Democrat; 
?=Strong Republican). Diverging from the standard model, three multidimensional 
models were tested. The first, derived from Klar (2014), measures ideology on two 
dimensions: social and economic. Respondents answered the following questions: 
"Which point on this scale best describes your political views when it comes to social 
issues? Issues like same-sex marriage and abortion;" and "which point on this scale best 
describes your political views when it comes to economic issues - things like taxes and 
the economy?" These were measured on were measured on 7-point scales (1 = Extremely 
Liberal; ?=Extremely Conservative). The next model presented 13 policy questions 
derived from the American National Election Study. These questions do not exhaust the 
totality of policies that might be related to an individual's general belief system, but they 
offer a range of politically relevant issues. These policy questions (both social and 
economic) were then used to create a policy ideology based on these two policy 
preference dimensions. In essence, social liberals are expected to answer social questions 
based on social liberalism, economic conservatives are expected to answer economic 
questions based on economic conservatism, etc. This measure allowed for ideology to be 
measured on what a person believes about important issues, rather than just their reported 
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ideology. This is important primarily for the reason that the American public's ideology 
is paradoxical: the American public is symbolically conservative, but operationally 
liberal (Stimson, 1991, 2004). Thus, Americans are much more likely to identify as 
conservatives, even though their policy preferences point to a more liberal outlook. By 
utilizing policy questions for a measure of ideology, the true operational nature of the 
respondents' belief system can be linked to intolerance judgments. The final measure of 
ideology is a novel one. Specifically, if conservatism is so linked to intolerance as the 
extant research suggests, a multi-item measure of conservatism is needed. The final 
measure utilizes such a measure. Proposed and validated by Everett (2013), the measure 
used certain issues specified by conservatives as central to their ideology. Through 
extensive validation, the 12-item measure reflects the nature of contemporary 
conservatism and measures both economic and social conservatism. Participants 
responded on a 0-100 scale with scores tied to intervals of 10 (0, 10, 20 ... 100). Items 
measuring "Abortion" and "Welfare Benefits," were reversed scored and then overall 
mean scores were computed to form three measures: the 12-item Social and Economic 
Conservatism Scale and for its two subscales. Mean values for participants varied from 0 
to 100, with higher scores indicating greater political conservatism. 
In addition to the three measures of ideology described above, the measures were 
manipulated to create non-standard ideologies (e.g. Libertarianism, Communitarianism, 
and moderate). By creating these measures, political intolerance can be examined on 
more than the left-right spectrum. To do this, Libertarian, Communitarian, and moderate 
ideologies were constructed based on the social and economic scales as well as the policy 
measures. In all, Libertarians have liberal social views and conservative economic views, 
Communitarians have conservative social views and liberal economic views, and 
moderates are between the left-right social and economic scales. 
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Central to this thesis is the effect that emotion, particularly hatred, has on 
intolerance judgments. In addition to hatred, anger and fear were assessed as possible 
mediators of intolerance judgments. Participants were asked to indicate how much the 
targeted group made them feel the three emotions. Each was measured on four-point 
scales (0 =Not at All; 4 =Very). These items concerned group-based hatred (hostility, 
hatred; a= .86), anger (a= .84), and fear (afraid, scared, and nervous; a= .81). Lastly, 
Participants provided demographic information such as age, gender, race/ethnicity, and 
education level. They also completed a political knowledge measure assessing whether 
liberals or conservatives supported eight different policies. Correct and incorrect answers 
were coded as 1 and 0 respectively, and were summed to form the political knowledge 
measure (a =.76). To better model the links between emotion and intolerance, Sequential 
Equation Modeling (SEM) will be utilized through SPSS Amos software. The path 
analyses will then be analyzed to ascertain the hypothesized links between emotion, 
threat, ideology and intolerance. It is important to note that the path analysis conducted 
will not determine causal links between the variables. Future work with more 
experimental methods will be required to determine causal links. The path analysis will 
allow for a better model construction of the hypothesized links between the variables. 
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Chapter 4. Hypotheses 
Research on political intolerance would suggest that conservatism is more 
predictive of political intolerance than liberalism. However, such findings have been 
challenged by the ideological-conflict hypothesis. Therefore the hypotheses following are 
meant to empirically test the ideological-conflict hypothesis and integrate it with 
multidimensional models of ideology and measures of affect. First, recent research has 
found inconsistent findings relative to the ideological-conflict hypothesis. Lindner and 
Nosek (2009) report that conservatism predicts intolerance judgments and liberalism does 
not, while other researchers (Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & Wetherell, 2014; 
Chambers, Schlenker, & Collisson, 2013; Crawford, 2014; Crawford & Pilanski, 2014b; 
Wetherell, Brandt, & Reyna, 2013) report ideological symmetry in intolerance judgments 
and willingness to discriminate. Thus, the weight of recent evidence points toward the 
following hypothesis: 
H1: Liberals and conservatives will be equally likely to be intolerant toward 
groups with whom they disagree. 
Given that there have been no attempts to empirically measure intolerance 
judgments in non-unidimensional ideologies (e.g. Libertarianism) or non-specific 
ideologies (e.g. moderates), an educated guess is necessary. However, based on the recent 
work indicating ideological symmetry (i.e. Brandt, Reyna, Chambers, Crawford, & 
Wetherell, 2014), it can be postulated that: 
H2: Libertarians will not be more intolerant toward outgroups and 
Communitarians will not be more intolerant toward outgroups. 
H3: Moderates will not be more intolerant toward any group. 
Other measures of ideology are expected to follow similar paths as the left-right 
ideologies. Given that a respondent's ideology as measured by the policy positions is 
more likely to capture their "true" belief system (Treier & Hillygus, 2009) and the 
social/economic dimensions of ideology and the 12-item Social and Economic 
Conservatism Scale offer additional multidimensionality, it is expected that 
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H4: Individuals reporting a liberal ideology based on their policy positions and the 
social/economic dimensions of ideology will be intolerant toward groups they 
disagree with as will individuals reporting a conservative ideology based on their 
policy positions and the social/economic dimensions of ideology. 
H5: Individuals reporting a Libertarian ideology based on their policy positions 
and the social/economic dimensions of ideology will not be intolerant toward 
outgroups. 
H6: Individuals reporting a Communitarian ideology based on their policy 
positions and the social/economic dimensions of ideology will be intolerant 
toward outgroups. 
H 7: Individuals scoring high on the SECS will be more likely to display intolerant 
judgments than those scoring lower on the SECS. 
Aside from measuring political intolerance, two measures of prejudice were used. 
One was based on the standard feeling thermometer and the other of a social distance 
scale. For the feeling thermometer and social distance measures, ideology has been found 
to be a consistent predictor of prejudice (Crawford, 2014). Thus it is expected that: 
H8: Liberalism and Conservativism will significantly predict prejudice as 
measured on a feeling thermometer. 
H9: Liberalism and Conservativism will significantly predict prejudice as 
measured on by social distance. 
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H10: Non-standard ideologies, including Libertarianism, Communitarianism, and 
moderates will not significantly predict prejudice as measured on a feeling 
thermometer. 
H11: Non-standard ideologies, including Libertarianism, Communitarianism, and 
moderates will not significantly predict prejudice as measured on by social 
distance. 
It is expected that emotion and threat will mediate political intolerance levels. It is 
well established that perceived threat is the most important predictor of intolerance 
(Sullivan et al. 1982). That robust finding is rooted in "realistic group conflict theory" 
(Sherif 1966), which shows that incompatible goals and interests (i.e. economic, security, 
property) are the main causes of intergroup hostility. Additionally, fear and anger have 
been found to have indirect effects on political intolerance (Capelos & Van Troost, 2007; 
Gibson & Bingham, 1982; Marcus et al., 1995; Skitka et al., 2004). There is limited 
empirical evidence regarding the influence of hatred on intolerance. Only one study 
(Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009) has examined the effects of hatred on 
intolerance, and they found that hatred is a strong predictor of intolerance. However, that 
study examined hatred during substantial intergroup conflict (i.e. Palestine-Israeli 
Conflict) and primed negative memories of the conflict. Given this and the finding that 
under stressful conditions emotions become more extreme and, in many cases, their effect 
on attitudes and behavior is more central (Huddy, Feldman, & Cassese, 2007, Skitka et 
al., 2004), it is expected that: 
H12: Hatred will be a significant mediator on intolerance and ideology, with 
greater levels of hatred predicting greater levels of intolerance. 
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H13 : Anger and fear will be significant mediators on intolerance and ideology, 
with greater levels of anger and fear predicting greater levels of intolerance. 
Finally, it is expected that political knowledge will moderate political intolerance. 
It has been found that for intergroup relations, sophisticated individuals tend to use 
ideology as the most important basis for their attitudes towards out-groups, emotions 
about the out-group were more important among the unsophisticated (Zinni, Mattei, & 
Rhodebeck, 1997). Following these theoretical and empirical studies (Luskin, 1987; 
Redlawsk & Lau, 2003; Sniderman et al., 1991), it is postulated that: 
Hu: Political knowledge will moderate the effect of hatred on political 
intolerance, such that greater levels of political knowledge will reduce the levels 
of intolerance. 
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Chapter 5. Results 
To begin, some basic descriptive statistics (Table 1) are necessary to set the scene 
for the regression analyses. The survey results were collected via Qualtrics and indicated 
a response rate of 13 percent. One factor that may have led to this response rate is that the 
survey was moderately long. Research has shown that longer surveys typically have 
lower response rates than those of moderate or short surveys (Deutskens, De Ruyter, 
Wetzels, & Oosterveld, 2004). The qualitative statistics of the sample indicate that the 
overall sample was predominately young, White, senior class females with at least some 
college or university education and a party affiliation of Independent to leaning 
conservative. For ideology of the participants, 88 identified as liberal, 45 as moderates, 
and 61 as conservative. Of the respondents who answered the question, these constitute 
the following percentages: 45.4% as liberal, 23.2% as moderate, and 31.4% as 
conservative. For the other non-standard ideologies, 34 (13.5%) were found to be 
Libertarians and 8 (3.2%) were found to be Communitarians. 
Political Ideologies and Intolerance Judgments 
In order to ascertain the nature of the relationship between political intolerance, 
ideology, threat, and emotion, ordinary least squares regression and path analysis were 
conducted. To begin, the results of the OLS regression are displayed in Table 2. First, the 
F-statistic indicates the overall significance of the regression equation, and in this case is 
found to be statistically significant for right-wing groups. The adjusted R squared value is 
displayed and indicates moderately strong relationships. 
40 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
-·----
Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Age 25.90 8.71 19 61 
Sex .38 .49 0 =Female 1 =Male 
Race 4.70 .82 1 = American Indian 5 =White 
Education Level 2.93 1.03 1 =High School Diploma 5 = Graduate Degree 
Class Standing 4.03 .89 l =Freshman 5 =Graduate 
Party 4.63 2.58 1 = Strong Democrat 7 = Strong Republican 
Ideology 3.64 1.63 l = Extremely 7 = Extremely 
Liberal Conservative 
Of the predictors examined in the first analysis, several stand out for more 
attention. For the unidimensional model of ideology, the results confirm research on the 
ideological-conflict hypothesis for right-wing targets, where conservatives are 
significantly more tolerant ofright-wing groups and liberals display significantly more 
intolerance toward right-wing groups. Diverging from the ideological-conflict hypothesis, 
non-standard ideologies perform as expected: Libertarians and Communitarians do not 
display significant levels of intolerance toward right-wing groups. Based on the social 
and economic dimensions of ideology, social and economic liberals significantly predict 
intolerance toward right-wing groups, and social and economic conservatives do not 
significantly predict intolerance. This is consistent with the ideological-conflict 
hypothesis. Again, moderates do not display intolerant judgments. Of real interest here 
are the policy issue ideologies. Although the ideological-conflict hypothesis predicts 
liberals would be intolerant ofright-wing groups, when measured by policy issues 
liberals do not display such intolerance. While the coefficient is positive, indicating 
greater intolerant judgments, it is not significant. The Communitarian variable is also 
significant, indicating greater tolerance for right-wing groups. Finally, the SECS measure 
Table 2: Regression Analysis of Political intolerance on Right-Wing Targets 
Hypotheses Variables b (SE) 
Unidimensional Ideology Liberal .76 (.17)*** 
Moderate -.06 (.49) 
Conservative -.77 (.19)*** 
Multidimensional Ideology Libertarian -.32 (.24) 
Communitarian .07 (.49) 
Social/Economic Dimensions Social and Economic Liberal .47 (.11)*** 
Social and Economic Conservative -.63 (.11)*** 
Social and Economic Moderate .03 (.18) 
Policy Issues Ideology Policy Liberal .19(.19) 
Policy Conservative -.23 (.05)*** 
Policy Moderate .05 (.17) 
Policy Libertarian -.13 (.19) 
Policy Communitarian -.28 (.11)** 
SECS SECS Conservative -.02 (.01)*** 
F-Statistic 29.61 *** 
Adjusted R Square .40 
Standard Errors in Parentheses.* p S .01; ** p S .05; ***p S .001. N = 252. Dependent variable 
measured on 6-point item scale (1 =Strongly Disagree; 6= Strongly Agree) for the two conservative 
target groups that were averaged to form the political intolerance measure. 
Beta 
.30 
-.03 
-.28 
-.10 
.00 
.29 
-.38 
.01 
.20 
-.49 
.03 
-.02 
-.50 
-.29 
is significant and predicts tolerance toward right-wing groups. The next regression 
analysis will test the ideology variables on left-wing groups. 
The results of the OLS regression on left-wing groups are displayed in Table 3. 
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First, the F-Statistic is statistically significant for both left-wing groups. The adjusted R 
squared value is displayed and indicates that some of the variance in political intolerance 
is explained through this regression analysis. From this regression analysis, the 
unidimensional model performs as expected: liberals display less intolerance toward left-
wing groups compared to their conservative counterparts. For both, the coefficients are 
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significant and in the predicted directions. The multidimensional model for the non-
standard ideologies is not significant, indicating no significant predictions in intolerant 
judgments. The social and economic dimensions conform to the ideological-conflict 
hypothesis: conservatives are more intolerant of left-wing groups than liberals are. The 
SECS performs as expected: greater conservatism predicts greater intolerance. 
Interestingly, policy issue conservatives are more intolerant toward left-wing targets (in 
line with the ideological-conflict hypothesis), but policy issue liberals are not significant 
in their tolerance toward left-wing groups. Once again, this is divergent from the 
predicted path of the ideological-conflict hypothesis. As in the right-wing analysis, liberal 
were not significantly more likely to display greater or less intolerance toward right-wing 
or left-wing groups, respectively. Thus, the analyses show different conclusions: the 
unidimensional model shows intolerance judgments in line with the ideological-conflict 
hypothesis, while the policy issue ideology measure shows greater intolerance among 
conservatives, but not liberals for their respective outgroups. This presents an interesting 
dilemma for the hypothesis. Does intolerance exist only in unidimensional conceptions of 
ideology, but not in multidimensional ones? What explains the fact that what people 
describe themselves as politically predicts intolerance, but what they are operationally 
does not? It is clear though that the ideological-conflict hypothesis, which seeks to better 
integrate current research on intolerance, might not capture the full picture with respect to 
intolerance and ideological dimensionality. 
Table 3: Regression Analysis of Political intolerance on Left-Wing Targets 
Hypotheses Variables b (SE) Beta 
Unidimensional Ideology Liberal -.64 (.16)*** -.27 
Moderate .37 (.45) .06 
Conservative .52 (.18)*** .20 
Multidimensional Ideology Libertarian .02 (.22) .02 
Communitarian .41 (.43) .10 
Social/Economic Dimensions Social and Economic Liberal -.53 (.10)*** -.36 
Social and Economic Conservative .25 (.11)** .16 
Social and Economic Moderate .20(.16) .09 
Policy Issues Ideology Policy Liberal -.13 (.09) -.19 
Policy Conservative .11 (.05)** .28 
Policy Moderate .12 (.06)** .15 
Policy Libertarian .03 (.12) .02 
Policy Communitarian .11 (.08) .23 
SECS SECS Conservative .02 (.01)*** .28 
F-Statistic 25.47*** 
Adjusted R Square .39 
Standard Errors in Parentheses.* p :S .01; ** p :S .05; ***p :S .001. N = 252. Dependent variable 
measured on 6-point item scale (1 =Strongly Disagree; 6= Strongly Agree) for the four liberal target 
groups that were averaged to form the political intolerance measure. 
Political Ideologies and Prejudice 
Aside from the standard measures of intolerance, measures of prejudice also 
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provide a venue for understanding ideologies' effects on intolerant judgments and beliefs. 
There are also two important reasons to include prejudice measures in the analysis. First, 
the ideological-conflict hypothesis does not separate prejudice from intolerance even 
though each are related, but distinct intergroup phenomena. Prejudice refers to negative 
evaluations of or feelings toward particular groups and their individual members (Allport, 
1954; Gibson, 2006; Mackie & Smith, 2002; Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010). On the other 
hand, political intolerance refers to the willingness to deny certain groups democratically-
guaranteed rights, such as the freedom to assemble, to speak publicly regarding their 
beliefs, to run for public office, or to organize in order to influence policy (Sullivan & 
Transue, 1999). Thus it is important to examine each separately to truly understand 
ideologically-based intolerance and prejudice. 
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The results of the regression analysis predicting prejudice and social distance on 
right-wing targets are presented in Table 4. The model preforms well and predicts a good 
amount of variance. Right off, it can clearly be seen that the measures of prejudice 
produce contrasting results. The prejudice measure based on feeling thermometers shows 
significant predictors of prejudice. Consistent with previous research, ideologically-based 
prejudice is observed: liberals are more intolerant ofright-wing groups than their 
conservative counterparts. Additionally, the multi-dimensional models show 
ideologically-based prejudice for the two standard political ideologies, while moderates 
do not predict prejudice. Policy issue-based ideologies also significantly predict 
prejudice, with large coefficients in the predicted directions. Communitarians predict 
prejudice too, but not as much as the standard ideologies. The social and economic 
conservatism scale performs as expected. 
Interestingly, the prejudice measure based on social distance is not predicted 
based on any of the measured ideologies except for the SECS. Two reasons may be for 
these outcomes on social distance. First, the social distance measure was meant to capture 
deep-seeded prejudice that is linked to psychological and physical responses through 
everyday events (i.e. "would you allow someone who belongs to group X marry into your 
family?"). Such questions reach deep into psychological beliefs that only true prejudiced 
individuals would feel. As such, it is possible that these individuals would be cautious 
Table 4: Regression Analysis of Prejudice on Right-Wing Targets 
Hypotheses Variables Prejudice 
B (SE) 
Unidimensional Ideology Liberal 5.51 (1.25)*** 
Moderate .73 (.62) 
Conservative -6.29 (1.29)*** 
Multidimensional Ideology Libertarian 2.52 (1.01) 
Communitarian -1.43 (.98) 
Social/Economic Dimensions Social and Economic Liberal 7.53 (1.99)*** 
Social and Economic Conservative -3.22 (1.04)** 
Social and Economic Moderate -2.47 (.88) 
Policy Issues Ideology Policy Liberal 9.34 (2.63)*** 
Policy Conservative -9.85 (2.66)** 
Policy Moderate -2.84 (.94) 
Policy Libertarian 3.06 (1.92) 
Policy Communitarian -6.55 (2.50)* 
SECS SECS Conservative -1.1 (.17)*** 
F-Statistic 29.61 *** 
Adjusted R Square .40 
Standard Errors in Parentheses.* p:::: .01; ** p:::: .05; ***p:::: .001. N = 252. Dependent variable 
measured by feeling thermometers toward the right-wing groups. 
Beta 
.35 
.05 
-.38 
.40 
-.12 
.42 
-.39 
-.05 
.39 
-.47 
-.14 
.08 
-.36 
-.46 
when answering such a question, and that non-prejudicial individuals would answer 
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according their egalitarian beliefs. Second, the SECS was meant to measure ideological 
conservatism based on a set of deeply held beliefs. Based on Based on this and the 
analysis by Everett (2013), it is likely that the SECS is capturing the most of the 
conservative ideology and as such would significantly predict measures of intolerance 
and prejudice. 
Table 5: Regression Analysis of Social Distance on Right-Wing Targets 
Hypotheses Variables Social Distance 
B (SE) 
Unidimensional Ideology Liberal 1.10 (.48) 
Moderate -3.85 (.46) 
Conservative -2.98 (.87) 
Multidimensional Ideology Libertarian .02 (.99) 
Communitarian -2.16 (.87) 
Social/Economic Dimensions Social and Economic Liberal 1.33 (.54) 
Social and Economic Conservative -3.20 (1.01) 
Social and Economic Moderate .47 (.69) 
Policy Issues Ideology Policy Liberal .89 (.84) 
Policy Conservative -1.29 (.54) 
Policy Moderate 1.70 (.63) 
Policy Libertarian 1.55 (.87) 
Policy Communitarian -1.36 (.44) 
SECS SECS Conservative -.19 (.05)*** 
F-Statistic 20.92*** 
Adjusted R Square .47 
Standard Errors in Parentheses.* p :-:; .01; ** p :-:; .05; ***p :-:; .001. N = 252. Dependent variable 
measured on 6-point item scale (1 =Strongly Disagree; 6= Strongly Agree) for the two conservative 
target groups that were averaged to form the social distance measure. 
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Beta 
.33 
-.05 
-.05 
.02 
-.05 
.13 
-.24 
.01 
.13 
-.33 
.21 
.17 
-.23 
-.40 
For left-wing targets, the prejudice model based on the feeling thermometers does 
not predict as much with regard to ideology as the right-wing model did. However, 
several variables stand out. Conservatives are significantly prejudiced of left-wing 
groups, while liberals have more favorable attitudes, but this finding is not significant. 
Social and economic liberals and conservatives display the predicted levels of prejudice 
or lack thereof. Once again, the SECS performs well on both models of prejudice. The 
social distance model again is not predicted based on the measured ideologies. From the 
Table 6: Regression Analysis of Prejudice on Left-Wing Target 
Hypotheses Variables b (SE) 
Unidimensional Ideology Liberal -5.09 (2.02) 
Moderate 1.93 (.61) 
Conservative 8.87 (1.31)** 
Multidimensional Ideology Libertarian 3.07 (1.75) 
Communitarian -.60 (.24) 
Social/Economic Dimensions Social and Economic Liberal -10.04 (2.45)*** 
Social and Economic Conservative 8.31 (1.84)** 
Social and Economic Moderate 2.05 (.94) 
Policy Issues Ideology Policy Liberal -13.09 (2.60) 
Policy Conservative 6.71 (.86) 
Policy Moderate 3.02 (1.27) 
Policy Libertarian 1.18 (.95) 
Policy Communitarian 6.99 (2.41) 
SECS SECS Conservative 1.62 (.32)*** 
F-Statistic 15.20*** 
Adjusted R Square .44 
Standard Errors in Parentheses.* p ::S .01; ** p ::S .05; ***p ::S .001. N = 252. Dependent variable 
measured by feeling thermometers toward the left-wing groups. 
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Beta 
-.30 
.13 
.17 
.03 
-.00 
-.26 
.24 
.14 
-.21 
.18 
.19 
.02 
.13 
.35 
prejudice analyses, it can be seen that prejudicial beliefs are ideologically-based, at least 
when measured through feeling thermometers. Such measures - e.g. feeling 
thermometers - likely capture global affective beliefs and thus are mere attitude measures 
rather than the event-based measure of social distance. 
Table 7: Regression Analysis of Social Distance on Left-Wing Target 
Hypotheses Variables b (SE) Beta 
Unidimensional Ideology Liberal -2.54 (.99) -.30 
Moderate 
-2.34 (.24) -.13 
Conservative 3.56 (1.02) .17 
Multidimensional Ideology Libertarian -4.20 (l .13) -.03 
Communitarian 1.03 (.76) .00 
Social/Economic Dimensions Social and Economic Liberal -2.51 (.82) -.26 
Social and Economic Conservative 4.31 (1.87) .24 
Social and Economic Moderate -.282 (.71) -.14 
Policy Issues Ideology Policy Liberal -2.39 (1.56) -.21 
Policy Conservative 3.02 (.78) .18 
Policy Moderate -.57 (.18) -.19 
Policy Libertarian -1.03 (.52) -.02 
Policy Communitarian 4.32 (1.18) .13 
SECS SECS Conservative .38 (.07)*** .35 
F-Statistic 15.20*** 
Adjusted R Square .44 
Standard Errors in Parentheses.* p :'.S .01; ** p :'.S .05; ***p :'.S .001. N = 252. Dependent variable 
measured on 6-point item scale (1 =Strongly Disagree; 6= Strongly Agree) for the four liberal target 
groups that were averaged to form the social distance measure. 
Does Hatred Predict Political Intolerance? 
Now that the relationship between ideology - unidimensional and 
multidimensional - intolerance, and prejudice has been examined, it is important to 
understand the psychology of those who display such intolerant judgments. It has been 
argued in this paper that distinct emotions, particularly negative ones, will play a 
significant role to those who display intolerant judgments. As such, several hypotheses 
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regarding negative emotions and intolerance were tested through regression and path 
analyses. 
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Table 8 shows the regression analysis for emotion; threat, and control variables 
predicting political intolerance. It can easily be seen that of the three distinct, negative 
emotions, only one significantly predicts intolerance on right-wing groups. It was 
hypothesized that hatred, given its powerful emotional effect, would produce the greatest 
predictive power, even above that of threat (previously found to be the most significant 
variable in intolerance) (Sullivan et al., 1985). This hypothesis was confirmed by the 
analysis. Specifically, the results for right-wing targets shows that hatred is the most 
powerful emotional predictor of intolerance, even when controlling for other emotions, 
threats, and socio-political variables. It is important to note too that the threat variables do 
not significantly predict intolerance. This is stark contrast to the literature on the 
antecedents of intolerance. The ideology variable does not significantly predict 
intolerance, indicating it is likely influenced by other variables. If the left-wing group 
analysis also shows like significance - i.e. hatred is a significant predictors of intolerance 
- such findings will have important implications for the overall psychological factors 
affecting intolerance. Likewise for left-wing targets, Table 9 shows that hatred is the 
most significant predictor of intolerance. The other emotional and threat variables are not 
significant. This indicates that hatred, as a psychological and affective process, is a 
powerful predictor of intolerance. In all, what these analyses show is that, even after 
controlling for other variables found to be significant predictors of intolerance, hatred 
emerges as the dominant emotion affecting judgments on intolerance. It is therefore 
important to consider hatred as a distinct and powerful emotional precursor to intolerance 
Table 8: Regression Analysis Predicting Political Intolerance on Right-Wing Targets 
Hypotheses Variables b (SE) Beta 
Emotion Hatred .26 (.12)** .35 
Anger .04 (.12) .22 
Fear .07 (.08) .28 
Threat Perception Symbolic .10 (.08) .31 
Realistic .10(.07) .09 
Rights .12(.07) .31 
Safety .09 (.09) .. 26 
Control Variables Age -.01 (.01) -.09 
Sex -.23 (.21) -.13 
Education Level .01 (.18) .12 
Race -.13 (.16) -.07 
Ideology -.05 (.08) -.34 
F-Statistic 34.37*** 
Adjusted R Square .34 
Standard Errors in Parentheses.* p :5 .01; ** p :5 .05; ***p :5 .001. N = 252. Dependent variable 
measured on 6-point item scale (1 =Strongly Disagree; 6= Strongly Agree) for the two conservative 
target groups that were averaged to form the political intolerance measure. 
in both liberals and conservatives. It is important to point out too that the non-
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significance of the socio-political variables is at odds with much of the previous research. 
This is likely due not to them having no significance in their predictive power on 
intolerance, but rather they are qualified by the stronger association between hatred and 
intolerance. Such findings correspond with previous works that show that the effect of 
socio-political variables on intolerance is frequently mediated by stronger psychological 
effects like perceived threat or hatred (Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2009; 
Halperin, Canetti-Nisim, & Pedahzur, 2007; Sullivan et al., 1985). 
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Table 9: Regression Analysis Predicting Political Intolerance on Left-Wing Targets 
Hypotheses Variables b (SE) Beta 
Emotion Hatred .30 (.11)* .37 
Anger .05 (.08) .24 
Fear .04 (.07) 
.22 
Threat Perception Symbolic .00 (.04) .20 
Realistic .01 (.04) .30 
Rights .02 (.04) .32 
Safety .03 (.04) .33 
Control Variables Age -.00 (.01) -.04 
Sex -.25 (.19) -.17 
Education Level .14(.10) .05 
Race .05 (.13) .14 
Ideology .04 (.06) .27 
F-Statistic 36.27*** 
Adjusted R Square .36 
Standard Errors in Parentheses.* p :<:: .01; ** p :<:: .05; ***p :<:: .001. N = 252. Dependent variable measured on 6-point 
item scale (1 =Strongly Disagree; 6= Strongly Agree) for the four liberal target groups that were averaged to form the 
political intolerance measure. 
Path Analysis: The Mediation of Emotion on Intolerance 
Because the influence of hatred and ideology is significantly larger than the 
influence of the other potential predictors on intolerance, it can be implied that hatred 
mediates the other effects on intolerance. Specifically, the level of hatred mediates threat 
perception and anger. Fear and ideology are also postulated to influence levels of 
perceived threat. To create such a model, structural equation modeling (i.e. path analysis) 
was used. In the model, the variables included hatred as a mediator to threat, anger, fear, 
and ideology. Figure 1 displays the model, which had an excellent fit to the data Cx2 = .50; 
x2 /df < 1; CFI = .97, RMSEA = .002, SRMR = .005). The results show hatred directly 
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Fear 
.25** .25** 
.39*** 
Hatred 
.70*** .28** 
Anger 
Figure 1. Path Analysis Model of the Effects ofldeology, Anger, Fear, Threat, and Hatred on Political 
Intolerance toward Conservative Groups. 
Note: p < .05*, p < .01**, p < .001***; standardized significant coefficients are reported 
affects political intolerance (.28) as predicted. The results also show that all the effects of 
the other emotion variables - anger (.70 x .28 = .19) and fear (.25 x .39 x .28 = .03)- on 
political intolerance are mediated by hatred. While anger and threat directly influence the 
level of hatred, fear as well as ideology do so through the mediation of perceived threat. 
In other words, anger will tum to political intolerance only if it directly affects hatred. On 
the other hand, the process of fear and ideology becoming intolerance is even more 
complicated. They have to affect threat perception, which influences the levels of hatred, 
which in tum induces levels of intolerance. The path analysis illustrates that hatred is a 
Fear 
~.28*** 
.23** 
Threat 
.35*** 
Anger 
Conservative 
Ideology 
Hatred 
.28*** 
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Figure 2. Path Analysis Model of the Effects ofldeology, Anger, Fear, Threat, and Hatred on Political 
Intolerance toward Liberal Groups. 
Note: p < .05*, p <.OJ**, p < .001***; standardized significant coefficients are reported 
distinct and significant emotional precursor to intolerance judgments. This significance is 
enhanced by the mediation on anger and threat. This is particularly important for threat as 
previous studies have found threat to be the most important precursor to intolerance 
factors mediating threat significance. This should not be taken as an endorsement of 
threat's insignificance on intolerance, but rather evidence of the complex psychological 
processes that underline intolerance judgments. In addition, the role of ideology -
likewise found to be a significant predictor of intolerance in this analysis and the 
literature - may not be as direct as once thought. It may not simply be that being 
conservative or liberal predicts how one will feel toward outgroups, but rather ideology 
may be a starting point by which other socio-political, emotional, and psychological 
factors influence intolerance judgments processes that underline intolerance judgments. 
In addition, the role of ideology - likewise found to be a significant predictor of 
intolerance in this analysis and the literature - may not be as direct as once thought. It 
may not simply be that being conservative or liberal predicts how one will feel toward 
outgroups, but rather ideology may be a starting point by which other socio-political, 
emotional, and psychological factors influence intolerance judgments 
Does Knowledge Mediate Hatred's Effect on Political Intolerance? 
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The analysis so far has examined the following: ideological dimensionality and 
intolerance; emotional antecedents of intolerance; and models predicting the causal path 
of emotion, ideology, and threat on intolerance. The final question to be examined in this 
chapter is how political knowledge affects intolerance levels. Specifically, does increased 
levels of political knowledge or sophistication act as "blocks" to the predicted influencing 
variables on intolerance? To test such a question, a regression analysis was performed on 
both left and right-wing targets as previously done. The results are presented in Table 10. 
What is immediately striking is the lack of significance in all, but one of the 
variables. As predicted, political knowledge significantly predicts lower levels of 
intolerant judgments. In addition, political knowledge acts as a "block" to every variable. 
This indicates that the presence of high levels of sophistication successfully mediates 
intolerance. The results are consistent in the left-wing model too: knowledge acts as a 
"block" to emotional, threat, and ideological processes, enabling greater tolerance toward 
outgroups. The results imply that levels of political intolerance among politically 
knowledgeable individuals are less influenced by negative emotions or threats. More 
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Table 10: Regression Analysis Predicting Political Intolerance on Right-Wing Targets 
Hypotheses Variables b (SE) Beta 
Emotion Hatred .14(.14) .30 
Anger .06 (.14) .06 
Fear .02 (.08) .06 
Knowledge Political Knowledge -.25 (.07)*** -.35 
Threat Perception Symbolic .12 (.10) .21 
Realistic .04 (.07) .05 
Rights .18 (.07) .22 
Safety .11 (.10) .20 
Control Variables Age -.04 (16) -.09 
Sex -.18 (.23) -.13 
Education Level .16 (.12) .12 
Race -.04 (.16) -.07 
Ideology -.17 (.06) -.29 
F-Statistic 29.15*** 
Adjusted R Square .40 
Standard Errors in Parentheses. * p :S .01; ** p:::: .05; ***p :S .001. N = 252. Dependent variable measured on 6-point 
item scale (1 =Strongly Disagree; 6= Strongly Agree) for the two conservative target groups that were averaged to 
from the political intolerance measure. 
specifically, while anger, hatred, and fear do not significantly affect intolerance at all 
among outgroups, hatred has the largest coefficient among the emotional variables. The 
results indicate that political sophistication has a large impact on the political processes 
involved in intolerant judgments. This is consistent with literature that shows political 
processes of decision-making are significantly impacted by knowledge levels (Luskin 
1987). What this analysis does not test though is political intolerance among 
knowledgeable and non-knowledgeable individuals as two distinct groups. Research has 
demonstrated that the sophisticated and non-sophisticated have distinct processes in their 
political reasoning (Rahn, 2000; Redlawsk & Lau, 2003). This research has even gone so 
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Table 11: Regression Analysis Predicting Political Intolerance on Left-Wing Targets 
Hypotheses Variables b (SE) Beta 
Emotion Hatred .23 (.11) .20 
Anger .07 (.09) 
.11 
Fear .02 (.07) 
.07 
Knowledge Political Knowledge -.29 (.07)*** -.32 
Threat Perception Symbolic .03 (.05) .05 
Realistic .03 (.04) .06 
Rights .00 (.04) .02 
Safety .00 (.05) .02 
Control Variables Age -.00 (.01) -.04 
Sex -.9 (.23) -.14 
Education Level .15(.11) .17 
Race .02 (.16) .05 
Ideology .12 (.08) .30 
F-Statistic 29.66*** 
Adjusted R Square .39 
Standard Errors in Parentheses.* p :S .01; ** p :S .05; ***p :S .001. N = 252. Dependent variable measured on 6-point 
item scale (1 =Strongly Disagree; 6= Strongly Agree) for the four liberal target groups that were averaged to from the 
political intolerance measure. 
far as to develop a "sophistication-interaction hypothesis" predicting that less 
sophisticated individuals make more frequent use of their emotions in establishing their 
political views about issues, groups, and leaders than non-sophisticated individuals 
(Sniderman et al., 1991 ). This analysis just examines overall knowledge among 
conservatives and liberals and its effect on intolerance. It is likely however that further 
analysis will show that, even when separated into two groups, sophistication moderates 
the effects of emotion and threat on intolerance judgments. 
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Chapter 6. Discussion and Conclusion 
Intolerance is still alive and well in contemporary America. In recent years, 
America has seen an uptick in intolerant views being displayed in public discourse. 
Whether it be the political debate surrounding immigration or the animus toward Muslim 
Americans, it is clear that the study of intolerance is likely to continue for some time. In 
the social psychology literature, intolerance and its antecedents have been treated with 
relative homogeneity. That is, hypotheses, models, and theories trying to explain the 
origins of intolerant beliefs have found that intolerance exists primarily asymmetrically. 
While other factors have been found to have more predictive power (i.e. threat 
perception), ideology has remained one of the stable variables explaining intolerance. In 
particular, the extant research, up to the last couple of years, has concluded with 
overwhelming evidence that conservatives are much more likely to display intolerance 
toward their respective outgroups than liberals are. However, this position has been 
challenged. Because of methodological flaws as well as potential biases in research, the 
ideological-conflict hypothesis was developed to integrate the new evidence showing that 
intolerance is in fact ideologically symmetrical. But other recent work (e.g. Linder and 
Nosek, 2009) has continued to find evidence of the "prejudice gap." So which model is 
correct in predicting intolerance levels through ideology? 
This thesis sought to try to rectify the disagreement between those that support the 
extant research on intolerance (e.g. ideological asymmetry) and those that support the 
ideological-conflict hypothesis (e.g. ideological symmetry). The results discussed in no 
way attempt to solve the disagreement as such a solution is likely unattainable. But what 
the results did indicate is that for both the extant research and the ideological-conflict 
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hypothesis, new conceptions of ideology as well as other psychological variables in some 
ways confirm and challenge the two opposing viewpoints. What should be discussed, 
therefore, is how the findings relate to the two views and how the two viewpoints could 
be modified to accommodate the new evidence. 
The results found in this analysis with respect to ideology and intolerance point to 
several things. First among them is that the evidence indicates that the ideological 
asymmetry and/or "prejudice gap" found in past research is likely overstated. No 
ideological asymmetry was observed in the regression analyses for either left or right-
wing targets, even after controlling for other conceptions of ideology. This indicates that 
the criticism of the methodological approach taken in past research has merit. The 
ideological-conflict hypothesis was tested and confirmed in the analysis, but with a 
caveat. The ideological-conflict hypothesis is in need of revision in order to integrate 
multidimensional conceptions of ideology. Specifically, when measured on social and 
economic dimensions, the ideological symmetry was largely confirmed. But what 
emerged is that when ideology is measured by responses to policy issue questions, the 
ideological-conflict hypothesis deviates from its predicted hypotheses. While policy issue 
conservatives do show greater and less intolerance toward left-wing and right-wing 
groups respectively, policy issue liberals are not significant in their respective intolerance 
judgments. The coefficients are in the predict directions, but lack any significance 
thereby negating their possible predictive power. This finding is possibly the more 
damaging for the ideological-conflict hypothesis as the policy issue measure likely 
captures "true" ideology. If an ideology is conceptualized as Converse (1964) did - a 
type of belief system or configuration of ideas/attitudes that are bound together in a form 
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of interdependence - then policy congruency is of importance. If an individual identifies 
as a conservative, but policy-wise has liberal preferences which measure is more likely to 
capture the nature of ideological beliefs, the standard left-right model based on self-
identification or policy issue measures capturing actual feelings toward real world issues? 
It is argued here that the policy issue model is more correct in its conceptualization of 
ideology. This is further enhanced by findings from Ellis and Stimson (2009, 2012) that 
Americans are symbolically conservative, but operationally liberal, and from Treier and 
Hillygus (2009) that American public beliefs are asymmetrical (i.e. conservative on one 
dimension, but liberal one the other, or vice versa). If such findings are indeed the correct 
way Americans orientate themselves politically, it is likely to mess with studies of 
intolerance based on standard ideological measurements. In all, the analysis shows that 
while largely correct on a unidimensional level, the ideological-conflict hypothesis likely 
needs to be modified to accommodate new multidimensional models of ideology. 
Another objective of this thesis was to test emotional hypotheses on intolerance 
judgments. It was hypothesized that hatred would be a significant predictor of 
intolerance, greater than any other emotional variable. This was confirmed through the 
analysis. Additionally, it was found that emotion plays a bigger role than threat 
perception does in predicting intolerance. Several implications should be discussed. First, 
this analysis is among the first to show that hatred is a powerful predictor of intolerance. 
Of the limited research on hatred, nearly all have examined its effects in conflict-ridden 
countries (e.g. Israel). This analysis is the first to study its effects in a western country 
where intergroup conflict rarely becomes intergroup violence. This analysis also fits in 
with the literature as it shows that hatred is stronger than well-established predictors of 
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intolerance derived from work on pluralistic intolerance (Sullivan et al., 1982). It has 
been found that threat perception is likely to drive people to intolerant judgment (Gibson, 
2006), but this analysis shows that hatred is an equal, if not greater, predictor of 
intolerance. Yet, hatred is not immune to one important variable: political knowledge. In 
line with models on political knowledge (e.g. Sniderman et al., 1991), knowledge acts as 
a kind of "block" on intolerance, possibly validating old findings on the role of education 
influencing intolerance (McClosky, 1964; Nunn, Crockett, & Williams, 1978; Stouffer, 
1955). In fact, McClosky (1964) postulated that "articulates" would be the only ones to 
display tolerance toward those they disagreed with as intolerance comes naturally to 
humans and as such, is difficult to cultivate the democratic norms tolerance requires. The 
political knowledge findings may provide evidence for such an "articulate" hypothesis. 
This study has several limitations that must be discussed. First and foremost is the 
sample that the hypotheses were tested on. While I defended the use of college students 
as an experimental sample, there is no denying that much of the social sciences is wary of 
using college students as experimental samples. As such, for those concerned with 
generalizability performing the analyses on multiple samples of diverse demographic 
variables would qualify the findings found in this thesis. Second, the conceptualization of 
ideology, intolerance, and prejudice is a debatable topic in social and political 
psychology. There is no one standard measure for ideology (even the very meaning of 
what an ideology is constitutes a debatable topic), prejudice, or intolerance, but each have 
the most-commonly used measures. As such, future research might discover new 
dimensions and factors underlining ideology that are not available today. Thus, findings 
have to be taken with an inherent caution as new models could either validate or 
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undermine the findings partially or in totality. Future research could also further explore 
the nature of hate on intolerance through more enhanced conceptualizations of hate and 
more experimental designs. For example, recent research (i.e. Halperin, Canetti, & 
Kimhi, 2012) has found that hatred comes in two varieties: immediate and chronic. Each 
has distinct characteristics, origins, and effects that likely differ in their influence on 
intolerance. It is likely also that to test such varieties of hate, in-lab experiments would 
have to be done as surveys would likely have trouble picking up the distinct effects each 
would possibly have. In all, studies on intolerance as well as its precursors and 
antecedents are not going to phase out anytime soon. Since Stouffer's (1955) classic 
study, social psychologists have been fascinated with the origins and effects of 
intolerance in pluralistic societies. Given the lively debate raging in political psychology 
now over the nature of ideology and intolerance, such works examining them will not 
only grow, but will be necessary to finally ascertain what defines us politically and how 
good people can make intolerant judgments. 
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Appendix: Coding Charts 
Gender Variable 
Male 1 
Female 0 
Age Variable Continuous 
Race Variable 
American Indian/ Alaskan Native 1 
Asian/Pacific Islander 2 
Black/ African American 3 
Hispanic/Latino 4 
White/Caucasian 5 
Recoded Race Variable for Regressions 
White/Caucasian 1 
Other 0 
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Highest Level of Education Variable 
High School Diploma 0 
Some College/No Degree 1 
Associate or Technical Degree 2 
Bachelor's Degree 3 
Graduate/Professional Degree 4 
Current Class Standing Variable 
Freshman 0 
Sophomore 1 
Junior 2 
Senior 3 
Graduate/Professional 4 
Party Identification Variable 
Strong Democrat 0 
Weak Democrat 1 
Independent Leaning Democrat 2 
Independent 3 
Independent Leaning Republican 4 
Weak Republican 5 
Strong Republican 6 
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Political Ideology Variable 
Extremely Liberal 0 
Liberal 1 
Slightly Liberal 2 
Moderate 3 
Slightly Conservative 4 
Conservative 5 
Extremely Conservative 6 
Social Ideology Variable 
Extremely Liberal 0 
Liberal 1 
Slightly Liberal 2 
Moderate 3 
Slightly Conservative 4 
Conservative 5 
Extremely Conservative 6 
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Economic Ideology Variable 
Extremely Liberal 0 
Liberal 1 
Slightly Liberal 2 
Moderate 3 
Slightly Conservative 4 
Conservative 5 
Extremely Conservative 6 
Political Intolerance Variables 
Strongly Disagree 0 
Disagree 1 
Somewhat Disagree 2 
Somewhat Agree 3 
Agree 4 
Strongly Agree 5 
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Political Intolerance Questions 
"I think that members of Emily's List, a Pro-Choice organization, should be Positively-
allowed to distribute pro-choice pamphlets and buttons on local college Worded 
campuses." 
"I believe that members of Focus on the Family, an organization that Negatively-
opposes gay marriage, should not be allowed to organize in order to pass Worded 
laws banning gay marriage." 
"I believe that the NRA, a pro-gun rights group, should be allowed to hold a Positively-
rally in support of more lenient gun laws." Worded 
"I think that American Atheists should not be allowed to organize in order Negatively-
to remove the phrase "Under God" from the Pledge of Allegiance." Worded 
"I believe that members of the Sierra Club, a pro-environmental group, Negatively-
should not be allowed to organize in order to influence government policy Worded 
on global climate change." 
"I believe that members of the Socialist Party should not be allowed to teach Negatively-
in public schools and universities." Worded 
Social and Economic Conservatism Scale 
Issue Dimension 
Abortion Social 
Limited Government Economic 
Military & National Security Social 
Religion Social 
Welfare Benefits Economic 
Gun Ownership Economic 
Traditional Marriage Social 
Traditional Values Social 
Fiscal Responsibility Economic 
Business Economic 
The Family Unit Social 
Patriotism Social 
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Social Policy Issue Questions 
Variable Question Coding 
Gay Adoption "Do you think gay or lesbian O=Yes 
couples, in other words, 
homosexual couples, should 1 =No 
be legally permitted to adopt 
children?" 
Affirmative Action "Do you favor, oppose, or 0 =Favor 
neither favor nor oppose 
requiring companies with a 1 =Neither Favor/Oppose 
history of discrimination to 
increase the number of 2 =Oppose 
minority workers through 
affirmative action 
programs?" 
Abortion "Which one of the choices 0 =Never Permitted 
best agrees with your view 
regarding abortion?" 1 =Only for Rape/Incest 
2 = Only If Need Is Clear 
3 = Always Permitted 
Gays in Armed Forces "Do you think homosexuals 0 = Should Be Allowed 
should be allowed to serve in 
the United States Armed 1 = Should Not Be Allowed 
Forces or do you not think 
so?" 
Gun Control "Do you think the federal 0 = Make It More Difficult 
government should make it 
MORE DIFFICULT for 1 = Keep the Rules the Same 
people to buy a gun than it is 
now, make it EASIER for 2 = Make It Easier 
people to buy a gun, or 
KEEP THESE RULES 
ABOUT THE SAME as they 
are now?" 
Death Penalty "Do you FAVOR or 0 =Favor 
OPPOSE the death penalty 
for persons convicted of 1 =Oppose 
murder?" 
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Economic Policy Issue Scale Questions 
--
Variable Coding 
Government Services 1. The government should provide many fewer services 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. The government should provide many more services 
Healthcare 1. The United States should have a government health insurance 
plan 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. The United States should have a private health insurance plan 
Environment 1. Tougher regulations on business are needed to protect the 
environment 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. Regulations to protect the environment are already too much a 
burden on business 
Standard of Living 1. The government should see to it that every person has a job 
and a good standard of living 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. The government should just let each person get ahead on their 
own 
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Other Economic Policy Issue Questions 
Variable Question Coding 
Public School Funding "Should federal spending on 0 = Increased 
public schools be 
INCREASED, 1 = Kept about the same 
DECREASED, or KEPT 
ABOUT THE SAME?'' 2 = Decreased 
Welfare Spending "Do you favor, oppose, or 0 = Increased 
neither favor nor oppose 
requiring companies with a 1 = Kept about the same 
history of discrimination to 
increase the number of 2 = Decreased 
minority workers through 
affirmative action 
programs?" 
Social Security Spending "Which one of the choices 0 = Increased 
best agrees with your view 
regarding abortion?" 1 = Kept about the same 
2 = Decreased 
Emotion Variables: "Please indicate how much Group X makes you feel each 
emotion ... " 
Very 0 
Somewhat 1 
Not Very 2 
Not at All 3 
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Threat Variables: "Please indicate the extent to which you think the following 
groups ... " 
To a Great Extent 0 
Somewhat 1 
Very Little 2 
Not at All 3 
Social Distance Variables: "Please indicate how willing or unwilling you would be to 
have someone from each of the following groups ... " 
To a Great Extent 0 
Somewhat 1 
Very Little 2 
Not at All 3 
Political Knowledge Variable: "Please indicate whether liberals or conservatives 
support the following policies ... " 
Correct Answer O=No 
1 =Yes 
Variables Measured on Feeling thermometers: 
Prejudice toward Six Groups 0-100 
Social and Economic Conservatism Scale 0-100 
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